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Abstract
We argue that a model of judicial behavior that accounts for differences in justices’
ability and ideology provides a fruitful alternative for the empirical analysis of judicial
decision-making around the world, and illustrate this by focusing on the case of the
UK. We show that the model explains the decisions of the Lords of Appeal remarkably
well, and improves the fit of a purely ideological model. We use our estimates to tackle
previously unaddressed questions about the relative role of justices’ preferences and
ability in the Appellate Committee.
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1 Introduction
The spatial voting model is at the core of a large number of empirical studies of voting
behavior in legislatures around the world. In the last decade, it has also been used ex-
tensively to analyze the voting decisions of members of the US Supreme Court. Progress
in this front inexorably led to the application of the spatial model to understand judicial
decision-making in other latitudes. In the last few years, judges from Argentina to Canada
and from Brazil to Australia have been classified as liberals and conservatives, extremists
or moderates.1
This progress notwithstanding, the straight application of the ideological model to
decision-making in the court is not universally accepted. The spatial voting model puts
forth an unwavering representation of legal realism (Segal and Spaeth, 2002) in which judges
decide cases exclusively based on their preferences, without attention to the context of the
law. On the other side of the spectrum, the classical view of legal scholars is that “judging
[is] more like finding than making”.2 While judges’ ideology can shape their opinions to
some extent, decisions in the court are primarily about how the facts of the case fit into the
body of the law and established legal reasoning. These alternative perspectives to what
judging is about meet head on when we think of desiderata for a member of the court.
Ideally, Gerhardt (2004) argues,
“[W]e would want to make sure that the [judge] has very sound legal skills;
asks intelligent, probing questions; thinks clearly if not imaginatively about
legal problems; identifies legal issues in a wide range of problems, is trained
at problem-solving, and understands the special duties that she will be called
upon to discharge.” . . . “The ideal temperament for a justice is presumably to
have the capacity to make decisions even-handedly [and] to be open-minded in
listening to and considering the arguments in the cases that come before him.”
The ideological model of judicial behavior is ill-equipped to capture several of these
key aspects: should a judge who is better at “problem-solving” be placed to the right or
the left of the political spectrum? Would we regard a judge who excels at “identifying
legal issues in a wide range of problems” as a moderate or an extremist? There is simply
no way to answer these questions in a sensible manner, because the ideological voting
1See for example Alarie and Green (2007), Desposato, Ingram and Lannes (2012), and Gonza-
lez Bertomeu, Dalla Pellegrina and Garoupa (2013).
2Rogat (1972), cited in Segal and Spaeth (2002), p. 87.
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model precludes their examination. This, of course, is not necessarily a problem per se;
understanding complex phenomena often requires substantial simplification. The relevant
question is whether the simplifications we accept in a particular model entail a fundamental
sacrifice in our understanding of the decision-making process in the court.
This paper considers this issue in the context of the British House of Lords. Besides
being interesting in its own right, this case is also particularly relevant for our purposes
in view of recent work by Hanretty (2013). In this paper, Hanretty shows that an item
response theory (IRT) model does not fit the data better than a null model in which judges
vote with the majority with a probability equal to the frequency with which they do this
in the sample, and concludes from this that “policy-sensitive models of judicial behavior,
whether attitudinal or strategic” are not useful to understand the voting behavior of the
Law Lords.
We believe that the comparison of a model’s fit against a mechanical (i.e., a-theoretical
or non-behavioral) null hypothesis should not be the primal factor in deciding whether to
discard the ideological voting model, or any model of judicial behavior for that matter.
The frequency of cases in which a judge votes with the majority in a given sample can be
effective to predict individual votes in the sample at hand, but tells us little of interest about
the behavior of judges. Thus, if we dismiss the ideological model, we remain empty handed
(see Achen (2002) for a similar point). We argue that a more productive approach is to
incorporate the criticisms raised against a theory into an alternative behavioral model, and
then contrast the empirical and substantive implications of the contending explanations.
We pursue this approach here, comparing the ideological model with what we are labeling
the learning model of judicial behavior, developed by Iaryczower and Shum (2012) in the
context of the US Supreme Court.
The learning model introduces a tradeoff between judges’ ideology and the information
supporting one decision over the other in a given case on the grounds of legal reasoning.3
Unlike in the ideological voting model, individual preferences do not fully determine judicial
decisions, but establish an informational hurdle for judges to rule in a certain direction -
e.g., liberal or conservative; in favor or against overturning the decision of the lower courts.
A judge leaning in one direction will vote against his bias if the information based on the
facts and on how the law applies to the case under consideration surpasses the threshold
3By ideology, we mean the system of ideas and manner of thinking characteristic of each individual
(New Oxford American Dictionary, 2013). This system of ideas can be related to political ideology, but it
can also be molded by personal experiences, judicial philosophies, and other factors that are unrelated to
an alignment in terms of conservative and liberal values.
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imposed by his preferences. The learning model therefore combines elements of both the
“legal” and “attitudinal” models of judicial behavior (Segal and Spaeth, 2002).
We begin by evaluating the efficacy of the ideological and learning models to account
for judges’ decisions in the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords. Our estimates
indicate that the purely ideological model of judicial behavior misses some relevant aspects
of decision-making in the court, and that (a simple version of) the learning model out-
performs (a simple version of) the spatial model according to a variety of goodness-of-fit
measures commonly employed in the literature.
The learning model of judicial behavior also allows us to distinguish the impact of pre-
ferences and ability on justices’ decisions. We can then quantify the discrepancies between
the traits of real justices in the Appellate Committee and Gerhardt (2004)’s ideal justices.
First, justices can differ in their “capacity to make decisions even-handedly”, as they
might be biased to vote in a conservative or liberal direction or be more or less prone to
reverse lower court rulings. In fact, we find that Law Lords tend to be quite moderate over-
all, in the sense that individual preferences only impose a low hurdle that the case-specific
information must surpass for judges to allow or dismiss appeals. The median justice in the
committee votes to uphold or overturn lower court decisions based essentially on the facts
of the case alone. Furthermore, our results suggest that partisanship is only imperfectly
correlated with judges’ preferences. Rather than being simply shaped by political or ide-
ological views, Lords’ biases seem to reflect general attitudinal differences that cannot be
easily ordered along a conservative-liberal dimension.
Second, justices might differ in their ability at “problem-solving” or, more generally,
in their capacity to map the law to the specifics of the case under consideration. We find
that there are indeed considerable differences in ability across justices. Moreover, these
differences are correlated with their judicial experience, and vary substantially across areas
of the law.
Finally, judges might differ from the ideal in terms of how open minded they can be
“in listening to and considering the arguments in the cases that come before them”. To
capture how much information specific to the case can alter the preconceptions based on
priors and bias, we compute the probability that each justice votes differently from what he
would have voted in the absence of case-specific information. We show that the importance
of case-specific information in the Appellate Committee has increased consistently between
1969 and 2002, leading to a court more prone to considering the facts and arguments of the
appeal in its rulings. This finding is consistent with prior work underscoring the gradual
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decline of political considerations and the heightened influence of professional merit in the
judicial selection process (Bingham, 2009; Malleson, 2009).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant
literature. Section 3 describes the learning model of judicial decision-making and relates
it to the more familiar spatial voting model. Section 4 describes the data used in our
empirical analysis, and Section 5 presents and discusses our main findings. Finally, Section
6 concludes. Additional results are reported in the Supplementary Materials Appendix
accompanying this paper.
2 Relation with the Literature
Our paper builds on the contributions of several strands of literature. Our estimation of
the ideological model of judicial behavior in the Appellate Committee follows a large body
of empirical research - mostly centered on the US Supreme Court - aimed at estimating
judges’ preferences and assessing its role in the judicial decision-making process. One group
of papers, beginning with Segal and Cover (1989) and Segal et al. (1995), used external
sources of information (e.g., newspaper editorials) to construct measures of judges’ policy
preferences and contrasted them against observed voting patterns. More recently, the
literature turned to recover justices’ ideology directly from their voting decisions (Martin
and Quinn (2002, 2007)) by estimating the spatial voting model commonly used in the
analysis of legislatures (Poole and Rosenthal, 1985; Clinton, Jackman and Rivers, 2004).
Our specification of the learning model of judicial behavior follows Iaryczower and Shum
(2012). This paper develops an empirical framework to estimate a model that allows for
a common value component and incomplete information. The resulting model extends the
purely ideological model by taking into consideration the quality of the case-specific infor-
mation available to justices and their ability to interpret and incorporate this information
into their opinions.4
In Britain, there is a vast literature on the political and legal aspects of the House
of Lords’ judicial role (Stevens, 1978; Paterson, 1982; Blom-Cooper, Dickson and Drewry,
2009; Paterson, 2013). Quantitative studies on the decisions of the Law Lords, however,
have been relatively scarce. Robertson (1982) was one of the earliest papers to apply
4The model was also applied by Iaryczower, Lewis and Shum (2013) to explore the impact of alternative
selection and retention methods on the performance of state supreme court justices. Iaryczower, Katz and
Saiegh (2013) implements a variation of this approach to model strategic voting in the US Congress. See
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) and Duggan and Martinelli (2001) for theoretical foundations.
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statistical methods in order to investigate the behavior of the Lords of Appeal in Ordi-
nary. Using multidimensional scaling to examine non-unanimous votes between 1965 and
1978, Robertson concluded that judges’ decisions were to a large extent discretionary and
strongly influenced by their “legal” or “professional” ideology. Robertson (1998) further
developed the idea. Similar results regarding the prevalence of substantive disagreements
in Law Lords’ judicial positions were reported by Arvind and Stirton (2012), who examined
cases brought against state bodies following the Human Rights Act 1998 using Bayesian
techniques. These studies generally adhere to the classical view of legal scholars that such
differences are largely unrelated to justices’ politics.5 This is also the key finding of Han-
retty (2013)’s paper, which constitutes the first attempt to analyze the decisions of the UK
judiciary within the spatial voting framework. None of these studies, however, explicitly
account for the interaction between idiosyncratic preferences and case-specific information
in their empirical analyses of judicial decision-making.
3 Models of Decision-Making in the Court
In this section we describe the spatial voting model and the learning model of judicial
behavior. While the spatial model is well known in the literature, it is useful to briefly
review it in order to clarify both the interpretation of the results and the differences and
similarities between the two models.
Common to both models is the decision-making environment. A panel of n justices,
i = 1, . . . , n, makes decisions on T independent cases. In each case t = 1, . . . , T , justices
face a decision between two alternatives, x0t and x
1
t . Justice i’s decision is coded as vit = 1
if he votes in favor of x1t and vit = 0 if he votes in favor of x
0
t .
6 The court aggregates the
decisions of the individual justices by simple majority rule; i.e. vt = 1 if
∑
i vit ≥ n+12
and vt = 0 otherwise. The two models, however, differ in their assumptions regarding the
preferences and information of members of the court.
The spatial voting model assumes that judges are perfectly informed about the char-
acteristics of the alternatives under consideration. Judges have euclidean preferences, and
alternatives can be represented by points in an n-dimensional euclidean space, X = Rn.
5This view is contested by Griffith (1977), but his work remains an exception within the academic and
popular literature.
6This coding is not uniquely determined. For example, we could code votes according to whether
justices vote to overturn or uphold the decision of the lower courts, or according to whether judges vote
for the “liberal” or “conservative” alternative.
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Each justice i has an ideal point zi ∈ X and, for any two alternatives x0, x1 ∈ X, prefers
x0 to x1 if and only if x0 is closer to zi than x
1.7 When the model is taken to the data,
it is standard to assume that the members of the court have quadratic preferences over a
single-dimensional policy space. In addition, in each case t, judges receive an individual
and alternative-specific additive shock to utility. Formally, when justice i votes for alter-
native x, he obtains a payoff Ui(x) = −12(zi − x)2 + εix, where εix is assigned a certain
(e.g., normal) distribution. Then vit = 1 if and only if Ui(x
1
t ) > Ui(x
0
t ), or equivalently,
letting ηit ≡ εi,x1t − εi,x0t ∼ N(0, ς2t ), if and only if ηit > (x1t −x0t )
[
x1t+x
0
t
2
− zi
]
. Thus, letting
λt ≡ x
1
t−x0t
ςt
and κt ≡ (x
1
t+x
0
t
2
), the probability of vit = 1 is Φ(λt[zi − κt]).
We can then estimate ideal points zi and midpoints κt relative to each other from the
likelihood function
Pr(vt) ≡
n∏
i=1
Φ(λt[zi − κt])vit [1− Φ(λt[zi − κt])]1−vit (1)
Note that (1) is a simple two-parameter item response model. As such, one could directly
use (1) for estimation without “buying into” the spatial voting model itself. It should be
clear, though, that if no commitment is made to the underlying theoretical model, the
resulting estimates cannot be interpreted as providing ideal points and midpoints in the
space of alternatives.
A criticism raised against the application of the spatial model to judicial settings is that
a model based solely on ideology misses important elements of the decision-making process
in the court. In this view, judges do not necessarily decide “on the basis of their political
positions, but rather on the basis of shared views of what the law requires” (Hanretty,
2013). In fact, incorporating this element does not preclude judges’ preferences or ideology
to come into play. As Iaryczower and Shum (2012) argue, uncertainty in the meaning of
the law allows justices to differ in their opinions about a case. With anything less than
complete certainty, opinions can vary across justices because of idiosyncratic thresholds
of proof brought by individual (e.g., ideological) biases or due to discrepancies in their
ability to evaluate the available information in different contexts (associated, for instance,
to differences in judges’ training or expertise).
This logic is captured in the learning model of judicial behavior, which introduces a
tradeoff between justices’ preferences and information. Judges are assumed to be imper-
7In this standard formulation, the ideal point is treated as constant over time. Martin and Quinn
(2002, 2007) allow judges’ ideal points to change in each period.
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fectly informed about the correct ruling in each case, according to the law. This imperfect
information can be due to the effect of time constraints, the complexity of the law, or the
intricacy of the case. We represent this ideal ruling by a latent or unobservable variable
ωt ∈ {0, 1} indicating whether the case-specific information favors the alternative x1t (if
ωt = 1) or x
0
t (if ωt = 0). Justices’ prior belief that ω = 1 is denoted by ρt. In addition,
before ruling in each case t, each justice i observes a private signal sit = ωt + σitεt, where
εt ∼ N (0, 1). This private signal represents the case-specific information that is salient
for each judge before making his decision. The scale parameter θit = 1/σit captures the
informativeness of i’s signal, with higher values indicating that i is more certain of the
directionality of the outcome.
Judges’ payoffs depend on the realization of ωt. In particular, given piit ∈ (0, 1), justice
i has a payoff of −piit if his decision is vit = 1 (in favor of x1t ) when ωt = 0, and of −(1−piit)
if he incorrectly votes vit = 0 (in favor of x
0
t ) when ωt = 1. The payoffs of vit = ωt = 0 and
vit = ωt = 1 are normalized to zero. Thus, given information sit, individual i votes vit = 1
if and only if Pr(ωt = 1|sit) ≥ piit.
Let s∗it denote the value of sit that solves the equation Pr(ωt = 1|sit) = piit or, equiva-
lently,
φ(θit[sit − 1])
φ(θitsit)
=
piit
1− piit
1− ρt
ρt
(2)
At s∗it, judge i is indifferent between voting in one or other direction. Because the
likelihood ratio L(s) ≡ Pr(s|ωt = 1)/Pr(s|ωt = 0) is increasing in s, higher signals make
the state ω = 1 more likely.8 As a result, the judge follows a cutoff strategy: i votes vit = 1
if sit ≥ s∗it and vit = 0 otherwise. The cutpoint s∗it therefore completely characterizes
individual behavior, and we can write the likelihood of justices’ votes in case t as
Pr(vt) ≡
∑
ωt
Pr(ωt)
n∏
i=1
[1− Φ(θit[s∗it − ωt])]vitΦ(θit[s∗it − ωt])1−vit (3)
Based on (3), we can estimate (θit, s
∗
it) for all justices and recover the parameters piit
reflecting their preferences or bias. We also consider a strategic version of the learning
model in which justices care about the decision of the court - and thus, about the votes
of the other members of the committee hearing the appeal. Estimation of the model with
outcome-oriented judges can be carried out as for the benchmark specification. In fact,
8It should be emphasized that the model does not assume that judges are more likely to make correct
than incorrect decisions, but only that the signals they receive are informative, in the sense that higher
signals are more likely when the state is 1 than when the state is 0.
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because the equilibrium of the outcome-oriented model is still in cutoff strategies, the
estimates of the voting strategies s∗it and of the precision of judges’ information θit are un-
changed with respect to the baseline specification. The fit of the model is also unaffected.
The difference is entirely in the estimate of the preference parameters piit.
Although in principle the ideological and learning models might seem completely un-
related, this is not necessarily the case. To make this connection clear, consider again the
case in which judges have quadratic utility functions over a one-dimensional policy space.
Suppose that in addition to the ideological dimension, justices obtain a payoff g(ωt, xt),
which takes the value ςt if their decision is appropriate on a legal basis (i.e., if the judge
chooses x1t when ωt = 1 and x
0
t when ωt = 0) and is zero otherwise. Then, judge i’s payoff
when choosing xt is Ui(xt, ωt) = −12(zi − xt)2 + g(ωt, xt), and he will prefer x1t to x0t if and
only if 2ωt − 1 ≥ λt[κt − zi]. This expression is similar to the one derived before for the
spatial voting model, with λt and κt defined analogously; i.e., λt ≡ x
1
t−x0t
ςt
and κt ≡ (x
1
t+x
0
t
2
).
The difference is that ω is an unobserved common value component. The common value
induces a correlation in individuals’ voting behavior, the extent of which is mediated by
justices’ ability and preference parameters. The fact that it is unobserved means that
judges (and not only the econometrician) are uncertain about the realization of ωt, and
will vote in favor of x1t only if
Pri(ωt = 1|sit) ≥ 1
2
+
λt
2
[κt − zi] ≡ piit (4)
Expression (4) illustrates that justices’ decisions in the learning model come from a
tug of war between their preferences and their case-specific information. If λt
2
[κt − zi] is
large, justices need a lot of information to overcome their bias piit. This happens when
the judge is not close to being indifferent between the two alternatives (|(x1t + x0t )/2− zi|
is large), when the two alternatives are very different to one another (x1t − x0t is large),
or when the payoff of getting the decision right under the law is low (low ςt). In fact,
limςt→0 piit = ±∞ depending on whether x
1
t+x
0
t
2
> zi or
x1t+x
0
t
2
< zi, so i will vote based solely
on his preferences as the importance of deciding in accordance with the law vanishes. If
instead individual preferences are less determinant, legal reasoning takes precedence. Note
that limςt→∞ piit =
1
2
, so i becomes more likely to base his vote on case-specific information
only as the gain from voting in the “correct” direction becomes more important vis-a`-vis
his personal preferences.
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4 Research design
4.1 Data
We obtained judges’ voting records from the High Courts Judicial Database (HCJD, Stacia
et al. 2011). This data set includes all the cases heard by the Appellate Committee of
the House of Lords (or the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council) between 1969 and
2002, divided in seven issue areas: Civil Liberties, Commercial, Criminal, Family, Public
Law, Torts, and Other. The vast majority (79%) of these decisions have been classified
as “liberal” (vt = 1) or “conservative” (vt = 0), and we use this classification to code the
individual votes of the committee members sitting on the panel hearing each appeal. For
robustness, we also consider an alternative operationalization of the dependent variable,
coding decisions based on whether judges voted to overturn (vt = 1) or uphold (vt = 0)
the ruling of the lower tribunals. This definition, which highlights the “quality control”
function of the Appellate Committee aimed at ensuring that lower courts do not make
wrong or inconsistent decisions (Dickson, 2007; Drewry and Blom-Cooper, 2009), assumes
that judges differ in their proneness to lower-court reversal rather than on their ideological
leanings, and avoids potential errors in the coding of liberal and conservative outcomes.9
We examine the votes of all judges who sat on the Appellate Committee, but exclude
from our analysis those cases heard by less than three justices and the decisions made
by a small number of Lords who heard very few cases.10 In total, the sample using the
liberal-conservative coding of outcomes comprises 1,206 unanimous and non-unanimous
cases heard by 54 judges; the corresponding number of appeals using lower-court deference
as dependent variable is 1,467. Table 1 below presents the distribution of cases by area.11
In Section 5.2, we estimate the learning model of judicial behavior allowing preference
and information parameters to be a function of the characteristics of the cases and the
9 For instance, pro-government rulings in public law cases are generally labeled as liberal in the High
Courts Judicial Database. However, as noted by a reviewer, this is arguably not how most decisions against
deportation or asylum claims would be currently interpreted among scholars and pundits in the UK. The
criteria followed to classify outcomes across different issue areas can be found in Appendix C of the HCJD
Codebook.
10Latent class regressions such as the one used to estimate the learning model are not identified with
less than 3 votes per case (Huang and Bandeen Roche, 2004). Cases heard by less than 3 Law Lords were
extremely rare, as panels of 5 judges became the norm - with additional members occasionally empaneled
(Blom-Cooper, Dickson and Drewry, 2009). We excluded the decisions made by Lords Avonside, Devlin,
Emslie, Gardiner, Havers, MacDermott, Parker of Waddington, Phillips of Worth Matravers, Taylor of
Gosforth, and Wheatley.
11Family law cases are not classified as liberal or conservative in the HCJD, but they are included in
the sample using lower-court deference as outcome.
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Table 1: Decisions by Issue Area
Outcome: Liberal/Conservative Outcome: Overturn/Uphold lower courts
Area Liberal Conservative Unanimous Minimal Total Overturn Uphold Unanimous Minimal Total
Winning Winning
Civil Liberties 36 53 75 5 89 42 46 75 5 88
(40.4%) (59.6%) (84.3%) (5.6%) (47.8%) (52.2%) (85.2%) (5.7%)
Commercial 67 97 141 13 164 177 179 299 28 356
(40.9%) (59.1%) (86.0%) (7.9%) (49.7%) (50.3%) (83.9%) (7.9%)
Criminal 114 224 296 23 338 139 200 296 23 339
(33.7%) (66.3%) (87.6%) (6.8%) (41.0%) (59.0%) (87.3%) (6.8%)
Family 26 27 49 3 53
(49.1%) (50.9%) (92.4%) (5.7%)
Public Law 214 135 282 34 349 158 197 288 34 355
(61.3%) (38.7%) (80.8%) (9.7%) (44.5%) (55.5%) (81.1%) (9.6%)
Torts 122 124 210 13 246 116 134 213 13 250
(49.6%) (50.4%) (85.4%) (5.3%) (46.4%) (53.6%) (85.2%) (5.2%)
Other 7 13 18 2 20 4 22 24 2 26
(35.0%) (65.0%) (90.0%) (10.0%) (15.4%) (84.6%) (92.3%) (7.7%)
Total 560 646 1,022 90 1,206 662 805 1,244 108 1,467
(46.4%) (53.6%) (84.7%) (7.5%) (45.1%) (54.9%) (84.8%) (7.4%)
Note: Percentages calculated in terms of the row-totals. “Minimal winning” are cases decided by a differ-
ence of one vote.
individuals. Biographical information on each committee member was obtained from the
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, the volumes edited by Carmichael and Dickson
(1999) and Blom-Cooper, Dickson and Drewry (2009), and newspaper articles and obit-
uaries from the Guardian and the Daily Telegraph. Based on these sources, we define a
justice as Conservative (Liberal) if he had contested a seat for the Conservative/Unionist
(Labour/Liberal) party or held a government post under a Conservative (Labour) admin-
istration by the time of his appointment, with no (partisan) political experience as the
reference category. The vector of judge-specific covariates also includes prior judicial ex-
perience, whether the judge was appointed to the court during a Conservative or Labour
government, and a dummy for English members of the committee.
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Among the case-specific covariates we include the substantive issue considered in the
case, the type of Appellant and Respondent – distinguishing between the State and Pri-
vate Parties (natural persons, businesses, non-profit organizations), whether the case came
directly from the Court of Appeal or from other tribunals, the fraction of justices ap-
pointed by a Conservative administration, the proportion of Conservative/Unionist and
Labour/Liberal judges in the committee as well as in the panel that heard the case, and
the identities of the Senior Law Lord and of the Lord Chancellor.
Tables S.1 and S.2 in the Supplementary Materials Appendix provide descriptive statis-
tics for these variables.
4.2 Estimation approach
Following the contributions of Poole and Rosenthal (1985), Heckman and Snyder (1997)
and Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004), estimation of the spatial voting model is standard
practice. Here we fit a hierarchical item response model with the parametrization suggested
by Bafumi et al. (2005).
Estimation of the learning model proceeds in two steps, following a Bayesian version of
the approach of Iaryczower and Shum (2012).12 In the first stage, we fit a finite mixture
model for the case-specific decisions via Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulations
(Gelman et al., 2004), obtaining posterior summaries for justices’ prior beliefs ρ and the co-
efficients of the variables affecting the reduced-form voting probabilities. In the second step,
we recover the equilibrium strategies’ cutpoints and structural parameters {θi, s∗i , pii}ni=1
from these reduced-form probabilities.
First step
Let ρt ≡ Pr(ωt = 1) and denote the conditional voting probabilities Pr(vit = 1|ωt = 1)
and Pr(vit = 1|ωt = 0) by γi,1 and γi,0, respectively. Given this notation, the likelihood of
judges’ votes in case t is given by:
Pr(vt) = ρ
n∏
i=1
[
γviti,1 (1− γi,1)1−vit
]
+ (1− ρ)
n∏
i=1
[
γviti,0 (1− γi,0)1−vit
]
(5)
12Some of the advantages of the Bayesian framework in this setting are that it allows for a detailed
description of the parameters and auxiliary quantities of interest via examination of their posterior distri-
butions, and that it helps account for the uncertainty in the recovered structural parameters while avoiding
asymptotic approximations - a convenient feature given that the total number of Lords included in our
analysis is rather small.
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Conditional on the state ωt, the individual votes vit are independent across justices. Thus,
the vector of votes vt = (v1t, v2t, . . . , vnt)
> follows a finite mixture distribution with mixing
probability ρ. In order to account for heterogeneity in the voting probabilities and common
prior beliefs, we allow ρ to vary as functions of case-specific variables Xt and model γi,j,
j = 0, 1 as functions of individual characteristics Zi:
ρ(Xt) =
exp(X
′
tα)
1 + exp(X
′
tα)
, (6)
γi,j(Zi) =
exp(δi,j + Z
′
iβj)
1 + exp(δi,j + Z
′
iβj)
(7)
where α and β are “fixed-effects” regression coefficients, and δi,j ∼ N(0, σ2j ) are judge-
specific random intercepts. Following Garrett and Zeger (2000), we assigned α a multivari-
ate N(0, (9/4)I) distribution that yields relatively flat priors for ρ centered around 1/2, and
used conjugate Gaussian and Inverse-Gamma priors for β and σ2j , j = 0, 1, respectively.
13
This hierarchical specification allows “borrowing strength” across individuals with different
number of observations and enables us to estimate judge-specific vote probabilities even
though the composition of the panels varies across cases.
The MCMC sampler alternates between three main steps: (i) updating α given the
state variable ω using a random-walk Metropolis step, and calculating ρ; (ii) sampling
ωt from its full conditional distribution given the other model parameters; (iii) updating
δ and β conditional on ρ and ω using random-walk Metropolis steps, and computing γ.
Each cycle of the algorithm is completed by updating the variances of the judge-specific
random intercepts from their full conditional Inverse-Gamma distributions.14 This leads
to an iterative scheme whereby, starting from an arbitrary set of initial values and under
mild regularity conditions (Gelman et al., 2004), we obtain samples of (ρm, γm, ωm) from
their posterior density at each iteration m = 1, . . . ,M . Three parallel chains with dispersed
initial values were run for 75,000 cycles each after an initial burn-in period, with convergence
13We also estimated an alternative specification assuming a bivariate N(0,Σ) distribution for δi and
a conjugate Inverse-Wishart (IW) prior for the variance-covariance matrix. The main results reported in
the manuscript do not change, although in this case a relatively informative IW distribution is required to
avoid weak identification.
14Additional technical details about the sampling algorithm are presented in the Supplementary Mate-
rials Appendix (Section S.2).
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assessed based on Gelman and Rubin (1992)’s potential scale reduction factor, Rˆ. Routine
sensitivity checks were performed to assess the robustness of the estimates to the prior
distributions. The average overlap between the prior and posterior distributions for the
parameters governing the latent class membership probabilities was quite small, indicating
that the model is well identified and relatively insensitive to prior assumptions (Garrett
and Zeger, 2000).
In order to deal with potential “label switching”, a well-known problem for MCMC esti-
mation of latent class models, we implemented the decision-theoretic post-processing algo-
rithm proposed by Stephens (2000). This provides a more theoretically sound and method-
ologically general identification procedure than approaches imposing prior constraints on
the parameter space (e.g., Stephens, 2000, Section 5). At each cycle m = 1, . . . ,M , the
relabeling algorithm considers the two possible permutations of the model parameters
and selects the one that minimizes the Kullback-Leibler distance between the posterior
probabilities P (ωmt = j|ρm, γm), j = 0, 1, and their posterior means
∑M
m=1 P (ω
m
t =j|ρm,γm)
M
.
More precisely, we choose the permutation νm of the sampled parameter values Ψ
m =(
αm, βm, δm, (σ2)m
)
that minimizes
T∑
t=1
∑
k
P
(
ωmt = k|νm(Ψm)
)
log
[
P
(
ωmt = k|νm(Ψm)
)
(M−1)
∑M
m=1 P
(
ωmt = k|νm(Ψm)
)] (8)
It must be noted, though, that visual inspection of the trace plots shows little evidence
of label switching in our analyses.
Second step
Since we assumed that sit ∼ N(ωt, 1/θ2i ), γi,1 ≡ 1− Φ(θi[s∗i − 1]) and γi,0 ≡ (1− Φ(θis∗i )).
Solving these equations for θi and s
∗
i given γ
m
i,1 and γ
m
i,0, m = 1, . . . ,M , yields:
θmi = Φ
−1(1− γmi,0)− Φ−1(1− γmi,1) and s∗i m =
Φ−1(1− γmi,0)
Φ−1(1− γmi,0) + Φ−1(γmi,1)
(9)
To obtain pimi , we simply plug θ
m
i and s
∗
i
m into the equilibrium voting condition (2).
5 Results
In this section we present our main results. We begin in Section 5.1 by evaluating the power
of the ideological and learning models to explain the voting decisions of the Law Lords.
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Since it is standard practice to estimate the spatial voting model without including individ-
ual or case-specific covariates, we use this “unconditional” specification for the comparison
between the two models. This also seeks to attenuate the influence of the differences in
functional forms and identification strategies used by the competing models, which can
pose some difficulties for in-sample comparisons (Clinton and Jackman, 2009).
We show that the learning model fits the data remarkably well according to a variety
of criteria commonly used in the literature, outperforming the ideological model of judicial
behavior. Based on these results, we describe the substantive findings of the learning
model in Section 5.2, specifying the preferences and information parameters as a function
of characteristics of the judges and/or the cases they consider. This allows us to directly
assess the correlation between factors such as justices’ partisanship or judicial experience
and their preference and ability parameters.
5.1 Comparing models of judicial behavior in the House of Lords
We evaluate the explanatory power of the ideological and learning models based on various
goodness-of-fit indicators commonly used in the literature. The different measures have
their own advantages and drawbacks, but together provide a fairly comprehensive picture
of each model’s ability to account for the observed data patterns.
Table 2 presents a detailed set of model comparisons for the analysis using the “liberal”-
“conservative” coding of outcomes. The first two rows present the most widely used
goodness-of-fit indicators for binary response models: the percentage of correctly classified
decisions and the proportionate reduction in error (PRE).15 We also include the expected
percent of correctly predicted decisions (ePCP) proposed by Herron (1999). This measure
is designed to overcome a potential deficiency of the classification success rates and PRE,
which can overstate the accuracy of the results due to their rather “coarse” treatment of
fitted probabilities. More recently, Bafumi et al. (2005) used the excess error rate, namely,
the proportion of error beyond what would be expected given a model’s predicted values,
as another way to test how well it fits a set of observations. Table 2 reports the absolute
value of the realized error rates averaged across judges and across cases.16 We also report
the Akaike (AIC) and Schwartz (BIC) information criteria for each model.
15The PRE measures the relative improvement in classification success rates vis-a`-vis a naive baseline
model in which each justice chooses the modal outcome.
16The interested reader is referred to Herron (1999) and Bafumi et al. (2005) for a description of these
indicators and the formulas used to calculate them.
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The first column of the table presents the goodness-of-fit indicators for the learning
model in the full data set comprising all unanimous and non-unanimous votes. This is the
appropriate sample for estimation and evaluation of the learning model, because the relative
frequency of unanimous decisions provides information about justices’ biases and ability.
Specifically, since justices disposing of a case are learning about an unobserved common
value component, we expect the size of the majority to be increasing in the precision of
justices’ private information. The large proportion of unanimous decisions observed in the
Appellate Committee can thus be naturally interpreted as a consequence of the correlation
in voting behavior induced by the common value component in our learning model.
In the context of the spatial voting model, however, unanimous decisions provide no
information about judges’ ideological position, and are therefore typically not included in
the estimation. For comparison purposes, we re-estimate the learning model using only
the cases in which there was at least one dissenting opinion. Columns 2 and 3 compare
the goodness-of-fit of the learning and spatial models in this restricted sample. We want
to emphasize, though, that this is done solely for comparison purposes. Unless we knew a
priori that cases decided by unanimity are uninteresting and fundamentally different from
the rest, fitting a model to this restricted sample comprising only about 15% of the appeals
would essentially constitute a form of data sub-setting that could generate selection effects
and distort conclusions about the judicial function of the House of Lords.
Two main findings emerge from Table 2. First, the learning model of judicial behavior
explains the data remarkably well when both unanimous and non-unanimous decisions are
considered, correctly predicting 95% of the individual votes. The proportionate reduction
in error and the expected percent of correctly predicted decisions also exceed 90%.
Second, the fit of the learning model is consistently better than that of the ideological
model. For instance, even in the restricted sample comprising only divided decisions, the
classification success rate and the ePCP for the learning model are roughly 10 percentage
points higher than for the spatial voting model. The absolute excess error rates averaged
across justices and cases are 6 to 11 p. points higher under the ideological model, with
more than 70% of the Lords having smaller realized error rates in the learning model of
judicial behavior (see Figure S.1 in the Supplementary Materials Appendix). It is also
worth noting that the average excess error rate under a null model in which committee
members vote with the majority is more than twice as large as under the learning model,
and almost 3 times larger in the full sample comprising all the committee’s decisions. The
learning model also fares better when we take into account the relative “complexity” of the
15
Table 2: Measures of Complexity and Fit for the Learning and Spatial Voting Models
Liberal (conservative) outcomes coded as 1(0)
All decisions Non-unanimous
Learning Model Learning Model Spatial Model
Correctly predicted 0.95 0.70 0.66
PRE 0.90 0.40 0.31
ePCP 0.92 0.61 0.50
Excess error rate: by judge 0.02 0.12 0.18
Excess error rate: by case 0.07 0.11 0.22
AIC 6,247.54 1,616.29 2,110.05
BIC 14,313.68 2,513.42 4,145.48
Number of cases 1,206 184 184
Note: In the spatial voting model, unanimous decisions provide no information
about the position of the Lords. Hence, we only report goodness-of-fit statistics for
this model for the sample in which there is at least one dissenting opinion in the
panel. To identify the IRT model, we normalized all the parameters as in Bafumi
et al. (2005) and constrained the ideal point of Baron Wilberforce - who ran for
Parliament as Conservative candidate - to lie on the conservative end of the policy
dimension. Similar results were obtained using other identification restrictions -
e.g., constraining Fraser and Morris of Borth-y-Gest to lie on opposite sides of the
ideological space, or Griffith to be more liberal than Bridge (Hanretty, 2013).
two competing approaches. As seen in the bottom part of Table 2, both the Akaike and
Schwartz information criteria are markedly lower for the learning model in the restricted
sample, providing strong evidence against the ideological model.17
A better approach to guard against overfitting is to compare the out-of-sample per-
formance of the competing models. As is well known, however, an important limitation
of the ideological model is its inability to generate out-of-sample predictions (Clinton and
17As a “rule of thumb”, AIC/BIC differences larger than 10 provide overwhelming evidence in favor of
the model with the lower value. See Ntzoufras (2011) and the references therein for an overview of model
comparisons based on information criteria.
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Jackman, 2009). In contrast, we can evaluate the out-of-sample predictive performance of
the learning model via leave-one-out cross-validation, contrasting judges’ decisions in each
case t with the votes predicted from a training sample excluding t. To simplify the com-
putations, we approximate the learning model’s cross-validatory predictive performance
by weighted resampling from the full posterior density (Gelfland, 1996). This yields an
out-of-sample classification success rate of about 95% in the full sample. The proportion
of correctly predicted decisions in the restricted sample is about 68%. For comparison, a
null model in which each judge chooses the modal outcome (of the training sample) cor-
rectly classifies only slightly more than 50% of the votes; a null model in which committee
members vote with the majority in each case cannot form out-of-sample predictions.
An important distinction between the ideological and learning models is that while the
former can recover the liberal-conservative orientation of each vote from the parameter
estimates (subject to identification constraints), the latter requires it to be defined a priori
through the coding of the dependent variable. It must be noted that, for about a third of
the individual decisions, the liberal-conservative classification taken from the High Courts
Judicial Database does not coincide with the labeling obtained from the IRT model, the
largest proportion of them involving public law appeals. In fact, the posterior mean of
the discrimination parameter is negative for roughly 10% of the non-unanimous appeals,
suggesting possible miscoding of their outcome (see Figure S.3 in the Supplementary Mate-
rials Appendix). Almost two-thirds of these cases belong to the public law area, where the
coding of liberal and conservative outcomes is arguably more controversial (e.g., footnote
9). Nevertheless, the 90% credible intervals of virtually all the discrimination parameters
in the IRT model overlap zero, regardless of the identification constraints adopted to deal
with rotational invariance.18 Thus, the inconsistency should be taken with a grain of salt.
Recall from Section 3 that the discrimination parameter is given by λt ≡ x
1
t−x0t
ςt
, where
x1t and x
0
t are the positions of the alternatives in case t and ςt is the variance of judges’
private preference shocks. Thus, the fact that λt ≈ 0 implies that in order to fit the data,
the spatial voting model needs preference shocks to be large relative to the distance between
alternatives. This suggests that the stable ideological component of judges’ preferences (as
captured by judges’ ideal points) does a poor job at explaining voting behavior.
18Similarly, when using judge- or case-specific predictors to resolve the aliasing (Bafumi et al., 2005),
the coefficient of the chosen separator variable is always statistically indistinguishable from 0.
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Alternative definition of the outcome variable. In the previous specification, we
assumed that the dimension of conflict in preferences among judges can be summarized by a
conservative/liberal policy space. In a more decidedly “legal” model, however, we can think
that disagreement among justices is primarily about the different juridical arguments and
how they apply to specific situations. In particular, in view of the Appellate Committee’s
role as the final appeal court in the UK until 2009, a potentially relevant distinction between
judges might be in the extent of the deference they give to the decisions of the lower
tribunals. We thus re-estimated the ideological and learning models coding a vote in favor
of allowing appeals as vit = 1, and vit = 0 otherwise.
19
Figure 1 contrasts the performance of the learning and spatial voting models in this
scenario, plotting their receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves. The ROC curves for
the learning model clearly dominate the curve for the ideological model, indicating again the
better fit of the former. In the restricted sample considering only non-unanimous decisions,
the area under the curve - a measure commonly used to compare the performance of binary
classifiers - is 0.75 for the ideological model and 0.82 for the learning model, a difference
that is statistically significant at the 0.01 level based on both DeLong and bootstrap tests.20
The proportion of correctly classified votes to overturn lower court rulings (“true positive
rate”) is more than 3 percentage points higher for the learning model, and the proportion
of decisions dismissing appeals that was incorrectly classified (“false positive rate”) almost
4 p.p. lower. Once again, using the full sample to estimate the ideological model leads
to a markedly improved fit: the “true positive rate” goes up from 0.65 to 0.85, the “false
positive rate” is reduced by more than half (0.13 versus 0.33), and the ROC area exceeds
0.95. The superiority of the learning model is further demonstrated in Section S.3 of the
Supplementary Materials Appendix, which presents a more detailed set of comparisons
based on the same indicators used in Table 2.
19For this exercise, we assumed constant discrimination across cases when fitting the IRT model.
20In the same direction, Venkatraman’s test comparing the two actual ROC curves (rather than their
areas) yields a p-value < 5.434e− 13. See Robin et al. (2011) and the references therein for an overview of
different statistical tests comparing ROC curves.
18
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 c
or
re
ct
ly 
cla
ss
ifie
d 
1'
s
Proportion of incorrectly classified 0's
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1
Learning model 
(all decisions)
Learning model 
(non−unanimous)
Spatial model
Figure 1: Model comparison based on ROC curves, using votes in favor of (against)
overturning lower court decisions as the dependent variable. Solid lines represent the
ROC curves for the learning and spatial voting models; the 45-degree line corresponds to a random
prediction model.
In sum, the results in this section support two fundamental conclusions. First, that
the learning model of judicial behavior fits the data extremely well, especially when all the
information contained in the committee’s decisions is taken into consideration. Second, that
- regardless of the particular coding of the dependent variable - allowing for differences in
justices’ ability provides a better account of the judicial work of the House of Lords than a
priori assuming that it is entirely driven by ideological conflict or idiosyncratic preferences.
In fact, as we show below, information about the cases was frequently powerful enough to
overturn the biases of the Law Lords during the period analyzed.
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5.2 Ability and Ideology in the Appellate Committee
In this section, we describe the substantive findings of the learning model of judicial behav-
ior in the Appellate Committee. We focus here on proneness to revert lower court rulings as
the outcome of interest.21 We thus fit the model to the full sample of 1,467 unanimous and
unanimous decisions coded as vt = 1 when they allow the appeal, and vt = 0 otherwise.
22
A crucial feature of the hybrid learning model is that it can disentangle the impact of
judges’ ability and biases on the court’s decisions. This, in turn, allows us to address a
variety of interesting questions that were previously beyond the scope of empirical models
of judicial decision-making in the House of Lords. First, to what extent are differences
in judges’ observed voting behavior attributable to idiosyncratic biases? Are political
factors associated with Lords’ biases in favor or against overturning the judgments of lower
tribunals? Second, what do we learn about differences in ability or quality of information
among justices in the court? In particular, what is the impact of judicial experience on
Lords’ ability to process information effectively? Third, we are interested in how bias and
ability interact with one another. Do individual preferences trump differences in ability
and information? Or, on the contrary, does case-specific information lead judges to vote
against their initial leanings? These are the questions we answer here.
In this setting, the parameter pii quantifies the barrier that idiosyncratic preferences put
on the information supporting the decision to allow or dismiss appeals. More specifically,
pii−1/2 represents a (possibly negative) hurdle to overturn the decision of the lower courts.
A completely unbiased judge (pii = 1/2) will vote to allow the appeal only when the law
and the facts of the case support a decision to reverse the ruling of the court below; i.e.,
depending on whether Pr(ωt|sit) ≥ 1/2 or Pr(ωt|sit) < 1/2. A judge who is a priori more
(less) inclined to defer to lower tribunals has a positive (negative) hurdle, and only votes
to allow an appeal if the case-specific information surpasses the hurdle imposed by his
preferences; i.e., if Pr(ωt|sit) > pii.
21This avoids controversies regarding the liberal/conservative labeling of cases. Using lower court defer-
ence as outcome also mitigates a potential concern raised by a reviewer regarding panel composition. The
criterion followed in the HCJD to classify outcomes is essentially based on who “wins” the appeal. For
instance, decisions favoring the government are usually coded as liberal (conservative) in public law (crim-
inal) cases. Since the government wins the vast majority of the cases, if panel selection is - at least partly -
based on substantive expertise, judges with experience in these areas could appear as liberal/conservative
even when they might not lean in that direction.
22We note, however, that the main findings regarding the role of information in the court and the
differences in judges’ ability hold for the liberal-conservative classification of outcomes as well. The inter-
pretation of judges’ biases, of course, varies according to the definition of the dependent variable. This
additional set of results is available from the authors upon request.
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Figure 2 summarizes the relevant findings about judges’ biases. The posterior means
of pi range between a lower bound of 0.33 for Lord Diplock and an upper bound of 0.75
for Lord Steyn. That is, Lord Diplock would be inclined to allow an appeal even when he
thinks that affirming the lower court ruling is more than twice as likely to be the correct
choice. On the other hand, Lord Steyn would only do the same if he thinks that the
probability that dismissing the appeal is correct under the law is below 25%. The bias of
the median judge (Lord Brightman) is 0.52, indicating that he votes to allow or dismiss
appeals depending essentially on the facts of the case alone. In fact, 95% of the estimated
pˆii lie between 0.33 and 0.67, and most of the biases are statistically indistinguishable from
0.5, implying that the informational hurdle to vote for or against overturning the decision
of the lower courts is rather moderate among committee members.
The relative ordering of justices’ preference parameters in Figure 2 seems to be related
to the party which appointed them. The average bias for a Labour/Liberal nominee is 0.47,
against 0.54 for a judge appointed during a Conservative administration, indicating that
the former are typically be more inclined to allow appeals than the latter. The likelihood
that a Labour/Liberal appointee is more predisposed to overturn a lower court decision
than a Conservative nominee is 0.87 on average across all cases heard by the Appellate
Committee.
21
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Figure 2: Individual biases. The figure provides posterior summaries of pi for each judge.
Solid squares (circles) give the posterior means for Conservative (Liberal/Labour) nominees, with
horizontal lines corresponding to the 90% credible intervals.
Political or ideological considerations, however, are not perfect predictors of justices’
biases. On the one hand, there is a considerable overlap in the posterior distribution
of individual preferences among Conservative and Labour nominees. Thus, the posterior
means of pii for Lords Dilhorne and Bridge, two conservative nominees, are below 0.4. Both
are more prone to reverse lower court decisions than Elwyn-Jones, the median Labour
appointee. Moreover, individual biases tend to be quite moderate also for justices that
could be assumed to be more decidedly “partisan”, such as those who served as Lord
Chancellors during Conservative (Hailsham, Mackay of Clashfern) or Labour (Elwyn-Jones,
Irvine of Lairg) administrations. There is also no systematic relationship between judges’
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own partisan affiliation and their predisposition to allow or dismiss appeals. Lord Reid,
one of the justices less a priori inclined to uphold lower tribunals (pˆiReid = 0.35), ran for
Parliament as a Conservative candidate, but so did Lord Clyde, who requires considerably
more evidence to overturn (pˆiClyde = 0.64).
23 The relationship between justices’ preference
parameters and their politics is further attenuated when we consider a strategic version of
the model in which judges care about the outcome of the case, rather than about their own
decision exclusively (Section S.5 of the Supplementary Materials Appendix).
Voting behavior in the learning model, though, is driven not only by individuals’ pref-
erences, but also by differences in their ability to extract relevant information from the
case facts. This is captured by the parameter θi.
24 Of course, it might turn out that in
practice there are only small differences in ability between judges, in which case voting
behavior would be mostly dictated by justices’ preferences. However, this is not what we
observe among the Lords of Appeal (see Figure 3). The value of θi ranges from 2.19 to 4.24
and is quite precisely estimated, with much less overlap between judges than for the bias
parameter. This indicates important differences in ability among committee members.
To better understand the implications of these differences in ability, recall from equation
9 that the estimate of θi is a function of the difference between the conditional probabilities
of voting to dismiss the appeal when legal considerations indicate that the lower court
decision should be upheld (ωt = 0) and when they indicate that the ruling should be
overturned (ωt = 1). That is, θi increases in the probability of correctly allowing the appeal
(γi,1) and decreases in the probability of incorrectly overturning the lower tribunal (γi,0).
Hence, Lord Morris, the judge with the lowest θˆi, has an 11% probability of incorrectly
allowing appeals and an 18% probability of incorrectly upholding lower court decisions. The
corresponding probabilities for Lord Bridge, the justice with the highest estimated ability
parameter, are substantially lower: 2.3% and 1.5%, respectively. On average, the estimated
probability that a Law Lord reaches an incorrect decision is 4.8%, with an asymmetric
pattern of mistakes: justices are more likely to vote to uphold lower court rulings when
they should overturn them (5.7%) than to erroneously allow appeals (4.1%).
23A similar conclusion holds if we consider experts’ opinions of judges’ ideological stance. For instance,
the biases of Ackner and Hobhouse, both seen as “conservative” by reliable commentators (Hanretty, 2013),
lie at opposite sides of the distribution of the preference parameter.
24To make this abundantly clear, we think of differences in θ as the differences we might see between
how an expert referee evaluates a manuscript and how an inexperienced graduate student does the same
job (keeping bias fixed for comparison). While the expert referee knows what to look for in a paper, an
inexperienced referee might get distracted with minor details and choose to publish a paper that should
not be published, or reject a paper that should.
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Figure 3: Precision of judges’ private information. The figure provides posterior summaries
for θ for each justice. Solid circles correspond to posterior means and horizontal lines to the 90%
credible intervals.
We find no statistically significant differences in ability between judges with and without
political experience, or between Conservative and Liberal/Labour nominees. However,
Lords’ ability estimates are correlated with their judicial experience. Keeping everything
else constant, each additional year on the bench is associated with a 0.4% increase in θˆi.
A committee member with no experience in the High Court is more than twice as likely to
incorrectly overturn lower tribunal decisions than one with 25 years of judicial experience,
and almost 31% more likely to erroneously dismiss appeals.
Naturally, both justices’ bias and ability can differ across issue areas, be it because
individual preferences weigh more heavily in some areas than in others or due to differences
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in justices’ expertise. In order to assess the variability of these structural parameters, we
re-estimated the model separately for each area of the law. Figure 4 reveals that Law
Lords are indeed significantly less predisposed to overturn decisions involving civil rights
and liberties than other judgments. The average judge is inclined to allow appeals in this
area only if he assigns a probability of at least 87% to the event that the standing decision
is incorrect under the law. In family law cases, in contrast, the average justice is willing to
dismiss appeals even if, based on the available information, there is a probability of only
12% that the lower court’s decision is incorrect. The relative ordering of judges’ biases
to overturn or uphold lower court rulings also varies across areas of the law, as shown in
Figure S.4 of the Supplementary Materials Appendix.
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Figure 4: Relationship between bias and ability across issue areas. The figure plots point
estimates and approximate 90% credible regions for judges’ biases and ability in civil liberties,
commercial, criminal, family, public law and tort cases. Dashed lines correspond to the average
bias and information precision across all the areas.
While we also observe some differences in ability across areas, these are not statistically
significant at the usual levels. We do, however, find important variations in the impact
of judicial experience on θ (Figure 5). Holding everything else constant, a one standard
deviation increase in judicial experience - roughly 5 years - is associated with an 8%-15%
increase in the precision of judges’ information in appeals involving commercial law, torts
and civil liberties. In the other areas of the law, the correlation between years on the bench
and ability is not statistically significant.
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Figure 5: Relationship between judicial experience and ability across issue areas. The
figure plots the expected percentage change in θ associated with a one-standard deviation increase
in judges’ years of experience on the bench. Circles represent posterior means, while vertical lines
give the 90% credible intervals.
In addition to their ability and judicial preferences, judges’ voting decisions are also
shaped by their prior beliefs. For given characteristics of the appeal and the decision-
making environment Xt, ρ(Xt) measures the initial probability that a judge gives to the
appropriate decision being overturning the lower court ruling before observing additional
information pertinent to the case.
The impact of prior beliefs on judges’ voting behavior depends on how precise is the
case-specific information. The noisier and more ambiguous this information, the larger
the scope for judicial discretion and the influence of judges’ biases and initial beliefs on
their decisions. To quantify the relative weight of information and predispositions in the
Appellate Committee, we use the “FLEX score” proposed by Iaryczower and Shum (2012).
For given characteristics of the case, the FLEX score measures the probability that, after
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observing a private signal, each Lord votes differently from what he would have decided
based on his prior belief alone, i.e., that vit = 0 (vit = 1) even though ρt ≥ pii (ρt < pii). It
is then given by ρtΦ(θi[s
∗
i − 1]) + (1− ρt)Φ(θis∗i ) if ρt ≥ pii, and ρt[1−Φ(θi[s∗i − 1])] + (1−
ρt)[1− Φ(θis∗i )] if ρt < pii.25
The average FLEX score in the sample is almost 0.45, demonstrating the sizable value
of information in the Appellate Committee: about half of the time the Law Lords voted
against their initial consideration of the case, based on bias and prior alone. The left panel
of Figure 6 shows that the likelihood that the median justice “changes his mind” after
observing his private information varies across areas of the law: FLEX scores are lowest on
average in criminal (0.39) appeals, and highest in commercial (0.48) cases. This is consistent
with Robertson (1998), who asserts that commercial law operates as an “hermetically
sealed system” capable of generating routine and very precise answers based on analogy to
precedents. Moreover, an overwhelming proportion of the Lords of Appeal was drawn from
the Commercial Bar. It is therefore reasonable for the value of information to be higher
in this domain than in criminal cases, an area in which Law Lords have traditionally had
little expertise (Drewry and Blom-Cooper, 2009), or in civil rights matters, where judges’
political views are arguably more salient and differences in their preferences more prevalent
(Malleson, 2009).
In the right panel we turn to considering the evolution of FLEX scores over time, on
average across all issue areas. Bingham (2009) and Malleson (2009), among others, assert
that the appointment process to the Appellate Committee became increasingly apolitical
in the second half of the 20th century, with a greater emphasis being placed on the legal
proficiency of the candidates rather than on their political or ideological views. Accordingly,
we would expect to see justices becoming more responsive to their private signals over time.
The evidence in Figure 6 is consistent with this view: the median FLEX score in
the committee rose by 13% between 1969 and 2002, with a particularly marked increase in
commercial and family law cases (see Figure S.5 in the Supplementary Materials Appendix).
It is also worth noting that FLEX scores in criminal appeals increased by almost 10% since
the 1970s, in line with Blom-Cooper and Drewry (2009)’s claim that the work of the Law
25The FLEX score is inherently a counterfactual quantity that can be computed directly from the
parameter estimates. For this counterfactual exercise to be convincing, the structural model has to be
invariant to the change in the environment under consideration. This is verified here because, by definition,
FLEX takes the characteristics of the case as given. This type of exercise is fundamentally different from
counterfactuals in Rubin’s causal model, where the key assumption is the “stable unit treatment value
assumption”, requiring the potential outcome for any particular unit to be unaffected by the assignment
of treatments to other units. No such assumption is needed in our context.
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Figure 6: Judges’ FLEX scores. The left panel plots the distribution of the median justice’s
FLEX score in each issue area; the dashed horizontal line gives the overall median score across
all areas. The right panel tracks the evolution of FLEX scores over time. Circles represent the
scores of the median committee member in each year, the solid lines gives the smoothed temporal
trend, and the shaded area corresponds to the 90% credible intervals.
Lords in this area - traditionally viewed as unsatisfactory - showed a distinct improvement
in the later part of the century.
Nonetheless, we must note that the median FLEX score was around 0.4 even in 1969.
By then, of course, the influence of politics in the selection of the senior judges in the UK
had diminished dramatically in comparison to the pre-1945 years, when - in the words of
Laski (1925) - judicial office was often “a reward for political service” (p. 535). While our
data does not allow us to test the long-term impact of this depoliticization process on the
work of the Law Lords, our results attest to the sizable weight of information in the court
throughout the period under study.
Agenda Setting. The House of Lords had ample discretion to determine its own judicial
workload - particularly in its later years - and typically dealt with a rather small, “hand-
picked” number of appeals (Drewry and Blom-Cooper, 2009; Paterson, 2013). The fact that
the selection of cases in the sample was not random means that we should pause before
29
extending the findings to other cases not included in our data set. It should be noted,
though, that to the extent that differences in the pool of cases can be captured by the
observable covariates Xt entering into the prior function ρ(Xt), variations in the prior will
measure this effect. While we would not argue that the covariates in our specification can
account for all possible case selection effects, we can use this fact to evaluate the presence
of a basic kind of agenda setting.
To do this, we allowed the prior to be a function of the committee’s composition, of the
political experience of the judges sitting on each panel, and of the identity of the Senior Law
Lord and the Lord Chancellor. This allows a basic test of whether the type of cases heard
varied with the political color of the majority or the party in control of appointments.
Figure 7 shows that this turns out not to be the case: none of these covariates has a
statistically significant influence on Lords’ common prior beliefs about the “right” judgment
in the appeals.26 The same result holds true for each of the issue areas considered separately
(see Figure S.6 in the Supplementary Materials Appendix). Because the proportion of cases
that came to the court after being granted leave to appeal directly by the Lords - as opposed
to via the Court of Appeal - varied considerably over time (Paterson, 2013), we also re-
estimated the model including a time trend among the predictors of ρ and replicated the
analysis for different sub-periods. The conclusions remained essentially unchanged.
26In fact, the only variable systematically correlated with ρ is the identity of the litigants. Other things
equal, judges are a priori significantly more likely to believe that lower court decisions should be overturned
(affirmed) when the State is the appellant (respondent).
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Figure 7: Influence of the committee’s composition on justices’ common prior beliefs.
The figure plots the expected percentage change in ρ associated with changes in the predictors.
Circles represent posterior means, while horizontal lines give the 90% credible intervals.
This suggests that even though the House of Lords increasingly controlled its own
docket, the choice of cases heard by the Appellate Committee was not contingent on the
judges’ politics or driven by changes in the positions of power. This marks a clear difference
with previous findings for the US Supreme Court (Iaryczower and Shum, 2012).
6 Conclusion
The ideological model of judicial behavior has been used extensively and productively to
analyze the voting decisions of members of the US Supreme Court. In recent years, its
scope has widened to cover courts around the world. Whether the spatial voting model is
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the most useful to understand decision-making in the courts, however, is less obvious. In
this framework, judges purely create law, apparently unconstrained by existing legislation.
This outlook clashes bluntly with the legal view of judging, in which decisions in the court
are primarily about finding how the facts of the case fit into the body of the law and
established legal reasoning.
In this paper, we compare the ideological model with an alternative model of judicial
decision-making that incorporates features of both the legal and the attitudinal models and
accounts for differences in ability and ideology among justices. We show that this alterna-
tive model of judicial behavior explains the decisions of the Lords of Appeal remarkably
well, and improves the fit of the ideological model.
The estimates of the learning model allow us to tackle a number of interesting questions
about the role of preferences and information in the Appellate Committee. First, we show
that even after controlling for differences in ability, the Law Lords are quite moderate
overall, in the sense that their biases do not impose overwhelming informational hurdles
to either dismiss or allow appeals. In fact, we show that the Law Lords are generally open
to change their initial stance based on the facts of the case and on how the law applies
to it. This occurs more often in commercial law cases and least so in criminal appeals.
Although judges’ biases are seemingly related to the party which appointed them, there
is substantial overlap in the distribution of individual preferences between Conservative
and Labour nominees, and Lords’ own political or ideological views have little influence
on their propensity to affirm or dismiss appeals. We also find that committee members
are quite heterogeneous in their ability to map the law to the specifics of the case under
consideration, and that judicial experience is correlated with judges’ ability.
Altogether, our results indicate that both differences in preferences and ability are
useful to understand the judicial function of the House of Lords. Law Lords are not either
merely finding how the facts of the case fit into the body of the law, nor freely creating
law to match their individual biases. Instead, their decisions are shaped by an evolving
balance between information and preferences, which reflects the power of the facts in each
case to override ideological considerations. Although we have focused our analysis on the
Appellate Committee, we believe that this tradeoff between preferences and information is
a defining characteristic of judicial decision-making.
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